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L Fas
On November 22,1996, DarickDemorris Walker ("Walker") kicked in the
front door of the apartment of Stanley Beale (Beale") and Catherine Taylor
("Taylor"). After kicking down the front door, Walker shot Beale three times.
Beale's thirteen-year-old daughter Bianca Taylor ("Bianca") later identified
Walker in a photospread as her father's killer. That same night, fourteen-year old
Tameria Patterson ("Patterson") was visiting a friend in Beale's apartment
complex Patterson testified at trial that Walker entered her friend's apartment
and said, "I shot himn." 1
On June 18, 1997, approximatelyseven months after Beale was murdered,
Walker entered the home of Clarence Threat ("Threat") and Andrea Noble
("Noble"). Noble awoke to find Walker standing in her living room with a gun.
Walker hit Noble with the gun and shot Threat in the leg. After a brief exchange
of words, Walker shot Threat six more times. Walker threatened to kill Noble
and her children if she told anyone what happened. Threat died from a gunshot
wound to the chest.2
Walker was indicted for capital murder under Virginia Code section 18.2-
31(8) for the murders of Beale and Threat within a three-year period? In the
Ciruit Court for the City of Richmond, a jury found Walker guilty and recom-
mended death, and the court sentenced him in accord with the jury's verdict.4
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Walker's conviction and death
sentence.' The United States Supreme Court denied Walker's petition for a writ
1. Walker v. True, No. 02-22, 2003 WL 21008657, at *1 (4th Cir. May 6, 2003). Bianca
testified that she knew Walker as "Todd." Id Patterson also testified that she knew Walker as
"Todd." Id
2. Id at *2. Noble testified that she knew Walker as "PauL" Id
3. Id; se VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(8) (Mvlchie Supp. 2003) (stating that the "willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing of more than one person within a three-year period" shall
constitute capital murder). Walker was also indicted on four counts of the use of a firearm in the
commission of a felony and two counts of burglary. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *2.
4. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *2. Walker was found guilty of the firearm and burglary
charges and sentenced to life imprisonment for each of the burglaries and eighteen years for the
firearms offenses. Id
5. Id; Walker v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E2d 565,577 (Va. 1999).
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
of certiorari.6 In March 2001 the Supreme Court of Virginia denied Walker's
habeas corpus petition.7 On October 29,2001, the United States Supreme Court
again denied Walker's petition for a writ of certiorari'
On February 1, 2002, Walker filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.9 The district
court dismissed Walker's petition and declined to grant him a Certificate of
Appealability ("COA7). 0 Walker sought a COA from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to appeal the district court's decision."
II. Hddig
The Fourth Circuit granted Walker a OA on two of the three claims he
presented, but denied them on the merits. 2 First, the Fourth Circuit held that
the district court correctly dismissed Walker's ineffective assistance of counsel
("IAC') claims because he failed to show sufficient prejudice. 3 Second, the
court held that Walker's claim that the Commonwealth withheld exculpatory
evidence was barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal 4 Finally,
the Fourth Circuit held that Walker's claim that his execution would violate the
Eighth Amendment should be treated as a successive habeas petition and should
be considered by the district court because the claim rested on a new rule of
constitutional law that applies retroactively.
A. C'Appiry
According to 28 U.S.C S 2253(c)(1), a petitioner must obtain a OA in
order to appeal a district court's denial of habeas relief.'6 The district court
provides the petitioner with his first chance to obtain a WOA 7 When "an
applicant files a notice of appeal, the district judge who rendered the judgment
6. Walker v. Virginia, 528 US. 1125, 1125 (2000) (mer.).
7. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *2.
8. Walker v. True, 534 U.S. 1003, 1003 (2001) (mer.).
9. Waker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *2.
10. Id; se28 U.S.C S 2253(c)(2) (2000) (stating that a (X)A will issue only "if the applicant
has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right"; part of AEDPA).
11. Waker, 2003 WL 21008657, at 2.
12. Id at *1.
13. Id at *7.
14. Id[ at "8.
15. Id at *11.
16. Id at 2; see28 US.C S 2253(c)(1) (2000) (stating that an appealmaybe takento the court
of appeals only if "a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability"; part of AEDPA).
17. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at 2.
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must either issue a certificate of appealabilityor state why a certificate should not
issue."  The Fourth Circuit statedthat its CDA determination was based on an
overview and general assessment of the merits of Walker's claims.19 Under the
standard set forth in Miler-Elv Cv a el,20 the court noted that a COA must be
granted "if, after a threshold inquiry, reasonable jurists would find the district
court's assessment of Walker's claims debatable or wrong."2 When a district
court rejects a petitioner's constitutional claim on the merits, the petitioner must
showthat reasonable jurists would find the rejection debatable or wrong in order
to obtain a COA.22 When a district court denies habeas relief on procedural
grounds, the petitioner must show" 'that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and
that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was
correct in its procedural ruling.' "23
The Fourth Grcuit nted Walker a GOA on two issues but denied a GOA
on his third claim"4 Wa r's third claim was based on his trial counsel's failure
to investigate and present important mitigating evidence during the sentencing
phase of his trial.2 Walker argued that the state court's denial of his IAC claim
was based on an unreasonable application of federal law.26 The district court,
holding that the state court correctly applied the two-part test set forth in Strid-
Lnd v Washir ' disagreed with Walker.28 The Fourth Circuit found that
reasonable jurists could not debate the district court's decision and denied Walker
a GOA on this claim.29
18. Id (quoting FED. , APP. P. 22(b)(1)).
19. Id
20. 537 US. 322 (2003).
21. Wake, 2003 WL 21008657, at *2 n.2; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,338 (2003); sre
Priya Nath, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 407 (2003) (analyzing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029
(2003)).
22. Waker 2003 WL 21008657, at *3; se Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(discussing the standard for obtaining a OA).
23. Walke, 2003 WL 21008657, at *3 (quoting Slade, 529 US. at 484).
24. Id at *1.
25. Id at *4. "Walker claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to timely
discover and effectively present school records and mental health history, failed to investigate and
provide records to . . . Walkers court-appointed mental health expert, and failed to discover
Waller's brain dysfunction." Id
26. Id The state court concluded that Walker failed to show deficient performance by
counsel. Id
27. 466 US. 668 (1984).
28. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *4;seStricland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984)
(stating that "the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient... [and] that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense"). The district court determined that Walker's trial
counsel was justified in pursuing an alternate theory. Waker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *4.
29. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *4.
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B. ThN zdx Bqfoe Peonnm
Walker argued that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
because "his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge
the constitutionality" of his single trial for two murders under section 18.2-
31(8).'o The state court held that Walker failed to prove his IAC claim under the
two-part test set forth in Stid/arl3' Walker claimed that the state court's
decision was "an unreasonable application of Striderd' and that he was entitled
to federal habeas relief. 2 In addition, Walker argued that the district court erred
in denying this claim." In order for the court to issue a GOA, only one circuit
judge must find that the petitioner made a substantial showing that he was denied
a constitutional right." The Fourth Circuit issued a (DA on Walker's first claim
"because Judge Gregory... [found] that reasonable jurists could debate whether
the district court should have resolved this claim differently.""
Under Strid&rar defendants must prove IAC claims byshowing that coun-
sel's performance was deficient and, as a result, the defense was prejudiced.
36
The state court held that Walker failed to satisfyeither StikLadprongY .'Walker
asserted that the state court's decision rested on an unreasonable application of
Sti&av 3 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1), the Fourth Cucuit cannot grant
habeas relief unless the state court's adjudication "resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."39 In
30. 1d; see US. COIsT. amend. VI (stating that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoythe right to... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence"); VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-
31(8) (Michie Supp. 2003) (stating that multiple murders within a three-year period may be joined
in a single trial).
31. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *4 (citing Stri&Ian 466 U.S. at 687).
32. Id at *5; see 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000) (stating that a federal court may not grant
habeas relief unless the state court's adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States"; part of AEDPA).
33. Waker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *3.
34. Id at *3 n.3; see4THOR. 22(a) (stating that "if any judge of [a] panel is of the opinion
that the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, the
certificate will issue").
35. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *3.
36. Id at *5 (quoting Stri&lar 466 US. at 687).
37. Id (citing Stpi&ar% 466 US. at 687).
38. Id
39. Id (quoting 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000)); seeLockyerv. Andrade, 123 S. C. 1166,1174
(2003) (stating that "[tlhe 'unreasonable application' cause requires the state court decision to be
more than incorrect or erroneous" rather, "(t]he state court's application of clearly established
federal law must be objectively unreasonable").
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Ccmnuwah v Srrz, ° the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the
Commonwealth may join multiple murder charges in a single prosecution under
section 18.2-31(8).41 The Fourth Circuit noted that Srr did not violate clearly
established federal law because the United States Supreme Court has never
addressed this issue.42
The Fourth Circuit first addressed whether Walker established that his
defense was prejudiced byhis trial counsel's failure to challenge the constitution-
alityof section 18.2-31(8). 43 In order to establish prejudice, the defendant "must
show that there is a reasonable probabilitythat, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."44 According to
St&idarl, a reasonable probability exists if confidence in the outcome is suffi-
ciently undermined.4 The state court concluded that no reasonable probability
existed that a challenge to the constitutionality of section 18.2-31(8) would have
changed the result of the proceeding.46 In light of Snith, the Fourth Circuit did
not find the state court's conclusion objectively unreasonable.47  The Fourth
Circuit, concluding that there was not a reasonable probability that a challenge
to the constitutionality of section 18.2-31(8) would have been successful, found
that Walker failed to satisfy the prejudice prong.4"
Walker also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel
failed to move for separate trials. The Fourth Circuit found that it was "not
objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that there was no
reasonable probabilitythat moving for separate trials ... would have produced
a different result."' The Fourth Ctrcuit found that trial counsel's failure to move
for a severance did not cause Walker prejudice.5" The Fourth Circuit stated that
40. 557 S.E.d 223 (Va. 2002).
41. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *6; Commonwealth v. Smith, 557 SE.2d 223, 226 (Va.
2002).
42. Waker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *6.
43. Id at *5; seVA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(8) (Michie Supp. 2003) (discussing the "willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing of more than one person within a three-year period").
44. Waker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *5 (quoting Stridba. 466 U.S. at 694).
45. Id (quoting Stride&lrn 466 U.S. at 694).
46. Id; see 18.2-31(8) (discussing the "willfulde, andpremedtated of more
than one person within a three-year period"); Stiy/ik 466 US. at 694 (stating that "It]he defen-
dant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different").
47. Waker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *6; seeSnilb, 557 S.E.2d at 227 (stating that two or more
murders may be joined in one trial if the murders occurred within a three-year period).
48. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *6.
49. Id
50. Id
51. Id The Fourth arcuit stated that "[tlo show prejudice, Walker must demonstrate that
there is a reasonable probability that the jury confused evidence of the predicate murder and
2003]
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it did not address the alleged deficient performance of counsel because Walker
failed to satisfy the prejudice prong under Strikland2
C Brady a n
Walkerclaimedthat the Commonwealth violatedBradyv Ma nr 3 because
it failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence.-' He argued that the undis-
closed materials could have been used bythe defense to impeach the testimony
of Bianca, Patterson, and Chris Miller ("Miller"). 5 The state court determined
that Walker was procedurallybarred fromraising his Bradyclaim regarding Bianca
and that his Brady claims regarding Patterson and Miller were without merit.5 6
The district court held that Walker failed to show cause for his failure to bring
the Brady claim on direct appeal and affirmed the state court's decision." The
Fourth Circuit issued a GOA on Walker's Brady claim because reasonable jurists
could find the correctness of the district court's ruling debatable."
1. Biamra
The Fourth Circuit first considered the state court's application of the
procedural bar to Walker's Brady claim regarding Bianca."9 At trial, Bianca
testified that she saw the shooter enter her house and shoot her father." Walker
claimed that the prosecution suppressed evidence that indicated that Bianca did
not see the man who shot her father.61 The state court ruled that Walker lacked
evidence of the capital murder." Id at *6. "Because the evidence for each murder was easily
distinguishable and the jury was instructed to consider each murder separately... Walker suffered
no prejudice from his counsel's failure to move for separate trials .... " Id at *7.
52. Id at *5; se Hedrick v. Warden, 570 S.E2d 840, 862-63 (Va. 2002) (Kinser, J., concur-
ring) (stating that if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim because petitioner failed to
show sufficient prejudice, then disposing quickly on such grounds is the best course to follow).
53. 373 US. 83 (1963).
54. Waker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *3; swBradyv. Maryland, 373 US. 83,87 (1963) (holding
that the prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to the accused if the suppression of that
evidence will deny the accused a fair triaD.
55. Walke, 2003 WL 21008657, at *7.
56. Id
57. Id; se Coleman v. Thompson, 501 US. 722, 750 (1991) (stating that a federal court
conducting habeas review is barred from reviewing a claim that was procedurally defaulted under
an "independent and adequate" state rule unless the petitioner can show cause for the default and
prejudice, or that failure to consider the claim would result in a "fundamental miscarriage of
justice").
58. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *3. Based on judge Gregor/s determination, the Fourth
Orcuit issued a GOA on this claim. Id
59. Id at 7-*8.
60. Id at *7.
61. Id Walker claimed that the Commonwealth suppressed the following. (1) the Supple-
[Vol. 16:1
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"standing to attack his final judgment of conviction by habeas corpus" because
the Brady issue "could have been raised and adjudicated at [Walker's] trial and
upon his appeal."62
The district court declined to consider the merits of Walker's Brady claim
regarding Bianca.6" According to Cdammv 77xhpsci;" a federal court may not
review the merits of a claim that was procedurallydefaulted under an "independ-
ent and adequate state procedural rule ... unless the prisoner can demonstrate
cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of
federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.""5 The Fourth Gircuit stated that it had
repeatedly found that the procedural default rule relied on by the state court
constitutes an independent and adequate state procedural rule.6
Walker did not challenge the "adequate and independent" nature of the state
rule, but instead argued that he could show cause and prejudice for the default.67
In MClskeyv Zant " the Supreme Court explained that cause excuses a defen-
dant's failure to raise a claim during state proceedings when "the factual or legal
basis for [the] claim was not reasonably available." 69 Walker argued that the
Commonwealth caused him to default his Brady claim regarding Bianca by
withholding documents until eight months after his direct appeal. 0 As support
for his assertion, Walker pointed to the Supreme Court's decision in Strideler v
Gree. 7' Strideker stated that "a defendant cannot conduct a 'reasonable and
diligent investigation' [as] mandated byMcGl/keyto preclude a finding of proce-
dural default when the evidence is in the hands of the State."" However, Striker
mentary Offense Report of Officer Ernst; (2) the Supplementary Offense Report of Detective
Mullins; (3) handwritten notes of Detective Mullins; and (4) statements made by Bianca and
Catherine Taylor to Detective James fickan. Id
62. Id (quoting Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680,682 (Va. 1974)).
63. Id at *7.
64. 501 US. 722 (1991).
65. CQda 501 US. at 750; swJohnsonv. Missssippi, 486 US. 578,587(1988) (stating that
a state rule is adequate if it is regularly or consistentlyapplied bythe state court); Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 US. 68, 75 (1985) (finding that a state rule is independent if it does not depend on a federal
constutional ruling).
66. Walke, 2003 WL 21008657, at *8; swFisherv. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835,844-45 (4th Cr.
1998) (discussing the "independent and adequate" procedural default rule set forth in S/a)).
67. Waker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *8. Walker did not argue that a fundamental miscarriage
of justice would occur if the Fourth Circuit refused to consider his claim Id at *8 n.5.
68. 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
69. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 US. 467, 494 (1991); see Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *8
(quoting Fisher, 163 F.3d at 845).
70. Waker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *8.
71. Id; Strickler v. Greene, 527 US. 263,263 (1999).
72. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657,at *8 (quoting Strideler, 527 U.S. at 287-88) (internalcitation
2003]
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distinguished cases in which the defendant was aware of the factual basis for his
claim but nonetheless failed to raise the claim." The Fourth Crcuit determined
that Walker "was aware or should have been aware" of the suppressed docu-
ments when he filed for direct review.74 Walker admitted receiving a pretenter
report before trial which referenced specific undisclosed police reports contain-
ing the same information." Thus, the Fourth Crcuit held that Walker did not
show cause for his failure to raise the Brady claim on direct review and that the
court was barred from considering the claim.76
2. PaumsonandMiller
Walker also argued that the Commonwealth violated Brady by withholding
evidence which could have been used to impeach the testimonies of Patterson
and Miller.' The state court found that no exculpatory evidence regarding
Patterson and Miller was withheld and rejected this part of Walker's Bradyclaim.'
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the state court that some of the evidence could
not be "characterized as impeachment evidence" because the evidence was based
on statements bypersons who did not testify.' The Fourth Circuit also stated
that Walker's defense counsel was aware of some of the allegedly exculpatory
evidence before trial.'O The court explained that "[i]nformation known by the
defense falls outside of the Brady rule."8 Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
state court's decision that Walker's Brady claim regarding Patterson and Miller
was without merit.82
omitted).
73. Id (citing Strike, 527 US. at 287).
74. Id
75. Id The Fourth Circuit is likely referencing the Virginia ode section 192-264.5 pet-
smtw report. 1d; se VA. CODE ANN. $ 192-264.5 (Mlchie 2000) (stating that "[wihen the
punishment of anyperson has been fixed at death, the court shall, before imposing sentence, direct
a probation officer of the court to thoroughly investigate the history of the defendant and any and
all other relevant facts, to the end that the court may be fully advised as to whether the sentence of
death is appropriate and just").
76. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *8.
77. Id at *9. Patterson testified that she saw Walker enter the apartment of Karen Randolph
("Randolph") and heard Walker say "I shot him" on the night of Beale's murder. Id Miller
testified that he observed an unidentified person leave Beale's apartment after the shooting and
enter Randolph's apartment. Id
78. Id
79. Id at *10.
80. Id
81. Id; seeUnited States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,103 (1976) (explaining that Brdyonlyappes
when information is unknown to the defense).
82. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *10. The Fourth Circuit found that the state court did




In Atinus v Viza,3 the United States Supreme Court held that the
execution of a mentallyretarded individual violates the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment."4 Walker argued that the imposition of the
death penalty in his case would violate A tim.5 Walker did not present this
claim in state or district court."6 The Fourth Crcuit "construe[d] Walker's
assertion of this claim as a motion for authorization to file a successive habeas
corpus application under 28 U.S.C S 2244(b)" because "Walker's A tkis claim
[was] 'a brand-new, free-standing allegation of constitutional error in the underly-
ing criminal judgment.' "87
Under 28 U.S.C S 2244(b)(2)(A), a successive habeas petition is allowed if
"the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.""8 In
A de/b, the Supreme Court announced a new rule of constitutional law that
applied retroactively. 9 Thus, the Fourth Circuit found that Walker's claim
satisfied the requirements of S 2244(b)(2)(A). The court granted Walker's
motion and authorized him to file a successive habeas petition in the district
court.9 The Fourth Crcuit noted that the district court was free to dismiss
Walker's petition "without prejudice to afford the Commonwealth of Virginia the
first opportunity to assess Walker's A tkim claim.""'
impeachment evidence and that a different result was not probable. Id
83. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
84. Waker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *11; see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US. 304, 321 (2002)
(holding that the execution of a mentally retarded person violates the Eighth Amendment ban on
cruel and unusual punishment).
85. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *11 (citing Atdinm, 536 US. at 321). Seewgnmdy U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII (stating that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted); Meghan
Morgan, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 267 (2003) (analyzing Atkins v. Commonwealth, 581 S.E.2d
514 (Va. 2003)).
86. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *11.
87. Id (quoting United States v. Winestock, 340 F3d 200,207 (4th Cir. 2003)); sw28 US.C
S 2244(b) (2000) (discussing when successive habeas applications shall be dismissed; part of
AEDPA).
88. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *11 (quoting 28 U.S.C S 2244(b)(2)(A)).
89. Id; seeA tk , 536 US. at 321 (concluding "that death is not a suitable punishment for
a mentally retarded crimina).
90. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *11; see 28 US.C S 2244(b) (2) (A) (stating that "[a] claim
presented in a second or successive habeas corpus a pplication under section 2254 that was not
presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless the applicant shows that the claim relies
on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
Court, that was previously unavailable"; part of AEDPA).
91. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *11.
92. Id;seeBellv.Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332-33 (5th Cr. 2002) (stating that "(tlhe state must
be given the first opportunity to apply the Supreme Court's holding in order to insure consistency
2003]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
IV. Applabnm in Vnza
A. Brady
The Fourth Circuit's decision to deny Walker's Brady claim illustrates the
importance of discovering undisclosed exculpatoryevidence." The court denied
Walker's claim because Walker's defense was aware of suppressed documents
when he appealed his conviction.94 The Fourth Circuit cited Stridkler for the
proposition that a defendant cannot show cause for his failure to bring a Brady
claim if he "was aware or should have been aware" that the exculpatory evidence
existed.9 The court in Stric/er held that "mere suspicion is not enough 'to
impose a duty on counsel to advance a claim for which they have no evidentiary
support.' "96 The court found that the existence of the presentence report
provided Walker's counsel with more than the "mere suspicion" of suppressed
evidence discussed in Strideler.97
It is evident that the Fourth Circuit did not require substantial evidence that
Walker's counsel was aware of the suppressed reports." Walker's admission that
the defense was aware of "a Presentence Report referencing two undisclosed
police reports" was enough for the court to deny his Brady claim.99 Attorneys
should constantly comb documents for any hint of undisclosed Brady material.
If defense counsel misses even a reference to undisclosed evidence, the court
may find that counsel should have been aware of the material and deny a Brady
cli.m. '.
I
among state institutions and procedures and to adjust its prosecutorial strategy to the hitherto
unforeseen new rule"); H v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 682 (6th Gr. 2002) (stating that "[t]he
Supreme Court's decision to return Atkins's case to state courts suggests that we should return
[petitioner's] Eighth Amendment retardation claim to the state for further proceedings .... [The
state] should have the opportunity to develop its own procedures for determining whether a
particular claimant is retarded and ineligible for death").
93. Waker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *7-*g; seBrady, 373 U.S. at 87 (holding that the prosecu-
tion must disclose evidence favorable to the accused if the suppression of that evidence will deny
the accused a fair trial).
94. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *8.
95. Id (citing Striier, 527 US. at 287).
96. Id at *8 n.6 (quoting Stri&er, 527 U.S. at 286).
97. Id at *8; seStidle, 527 U.S. at 286 (stating that "[m]ere speculation that some exculpa-
tory material may have been withheld is unlikely to establish good cause for a discoveryrequest on
collateral review... [n]or, in our opinion, should such suspicion suffice to impose a dutyon counsel
to advance a claim for which they have no evidentiary support").
98. Waker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *8.
99. Id
100. See id (denying Walker's Brady claim because his counsel "was aware of the factual basis"




The Fourth Circuit's discussion of A tkim highlights the court's willingness
to recognize successive habeas petitions for mental retardation claims in capital
cases.10 In federal habeas cases concerning possible mental retardation issues,
counsel should file a motion for a successive petition.0 2 In Walker, the Fourth
Grcuit authorized the district court to consider Walker's successive habeas
petition, but recommended that the district court "dismiss it without prejudice
to afford the Commonwealth of Virginia the first opportunity to assess Walker's
A i ns claim."'0 3 Defense counsel in Virginia should be aware that when the case
gets back to the state court, Vuginia's new statutoryprocedures for considering
mental retardation claims will apply.'°  Under Virginia Code section 19.2-
264.3:1.1, enacted in response to the Supreme Court's decision in A tki, the
defendant bears the burden of proving mental retardation by a preponderance
of the evidence.'0 5 The burden should fall on the Commonwealth to prove the
absence of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant
becomes death eligible. " Under Rig v A rizona,"'0 the absence of mental retar-
dation is an element of the death-eligible offense that must be found bya jury.08
The absence of mental retardation is analytically identical to the Eighth Amend-
ment requirement that mens rea and actus reus must be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt before the jurycan considerdeath.'" Virginia should treat mental retarda
101. Id at *l ;seeA &im, 536 US. at 321 (holding thatexecuting a mentallyretarded individual
violates the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment).
102. Se,28 U.S.C S 2244(b)(2)(A) (2000) (stating that a successive habeas petition is allowed
if "the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable"; part of AEDPA).
103. Walker, 2003 WL 21008657, at *11.
104. S&VA. CODE ANN. S 192-2643:1.1 (lfchie Supp. 2003) (discussing the determination
of mental retardation in capital cases); VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-2643:1.1(A) (Michie Supp. 2003)
(stating that" 'mentaflyretarded' means a disability, origi ati before the age of 18 years, character-
ized concurrently by (i significantly subaverage c functioning... and (i significant
limitations in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social and practical adaptive skills").
105. SwVA.CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1.1(Q (stating that "the defendant shallbearthe burden
of proving that he is mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence"); A tk in, 536 U.S. at
321 (holding that executing a mentally retarded individual violates the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel a unusual punishments); Morgan, supra note 85, at 271 (analyzing Atkins v. Common-
wealth, 581 S.E.2d 514 (Va. 2003)).
106. See gmray Kristen F. Grunewald, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 117, 123-24 (2002)
(analyzing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US. 304 (2002)).
107. 536 US. 584 (2002).
108. SeeRing v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,609 (2002) (holding that any"factor" which makes the
defendant death eligible functions as an element of the offense and the Sixth Amendment demands
that it be found by a jury).
109. Ser Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156-58 (1987) (holding that if an individualized
inquiry into a defendant's mental state reveals major participation in a felony and reckless indiffer-
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tion as a factor that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
before the jury can consider the issue of death."1 However, practitioners should
be aware that Virginia presently requires the defendant to prove mental retarda-
tion by a preponderance of the evidence."1
V. Caxwaion
The Fourth Circuit granted Walker a CDA on his claims that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial and that the
Commonwealth failed to disclose Brady material. 12 However, the Fourth Circuit
denied habeas relief for both claims because the state court's adjudication did not
result in an unreasonable application of federal law.13 The Fourth Circuit also
determined that A tkim is retroactive and authorized the district court to treat
Walker's Eight Amendment claim as a successive habeas petition.
4
Jessie A. Seiden
ence to human life, the culpability requirement of E£meaiis sufficient to warrant imposition of the
death penalt}; Enmund v. Florida, 458 US. 782, 801 (1982) (holding that a sentence of death is
excessive and in violation of the Eight Amendment when imposed on an accomplice to murder).
110. SeeVA. CODE ANN. S 182-31 (ichie Supp. 2003) (subsuming the Tnc" issue because
"willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing" is an element of capital murder in Virginia); VA. CODE
ANN. S 18.2-18 vfchie Supp. 2003) (subsuming the Ewvidactus reus requirement bysetting forth
the limited circumstances under which a principal in the second degree or an accessory before the
fact may be charged with capital murder).
111. See VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.3:1.1(Q (Mfichie Supp. 2003) (placing the burden of
proving mental retardation on the defendant).
112. Walke, 2003 WL 21008657, at *12.
113. Id
114. Id
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